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This paper applies the theory of auctioning incentive contracts to welfare-to-work programs. In
several countries, the government procures welfare-to-work projects to employment service
providers. In doing so, the government trades off adverse selection (the winning provider is not
the most efﬁcient one) and moral hazard (the winning provider shirks in his effort to reintegrate
unemployed people). We compare three simple auctions with the socially optimal mechanism
and show that two of these auctions approximate the optimal mechanism if the number of
providers is large. Using simulations, we observe that competition between three bidders is
already sufﬁcient for the outcome of these auctions to reach 95% of the optimal level of social
welfare.
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Abstract in Dutch
Dit Discussion Paper past de theorie van het veilen van prestatiecontracten toe op
reïntegratieprogramma’s. In verschillende landen kunnen reïntegratiebedrijven meedingen in
publieke aanbestedingen van reïntegratietrajecten. De aanbestedende overheden moeten daarbij
averechtse selectie (het winnende bedrijf is niet het meest geschikte) afwegen tegen moral
hazard (het winnende bedrijf doet onvoldoende zijn best om werklozen aan het werk te helpen).
We vergelijken drie eenvoudige veilingen met het sociaal optimale mechanisme en laten zien dat
twee van deze veilingen het optimale mechanisme benaderen als het aantal biedende bedrijven
groot wordt. Met behulp van simulaties observeren we dat voor deze veilingen concurrentie
tussen drie bieders al voldoende is om 95% van het maximaal haalbare sociale welvaart te
bereiken.
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56Summary
In several countries, including the Netherlands, governments use procurements for
welfare-to-work programs. In these procurements, the government sells welfare-to- work
projects to employment service providers. A welfare-to-work project typically consists of a
number of unemployed people, and the winning provider is rewarded on the basis of the number
of these people that ﬁnd a job within a speciﬁed period of time.
In reaching their targets, governments may be confronted with two types of economic
problems: adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection occurs when the procurement
does not select the ‘best’ employment provider, i.e., the provider that, relative to all other
providers, is able to help the unemployed people back to work in the most cost efﬁcient way.
Moral hazard may occur as the winner of the procurement has no incentive to put much effort in
the welfare-to-work project.
Most governments that procure welfare-to-work programs use a beauty contest. But, are
beauty contests indeed optimal? In this paper, we study mechanisms that are simpler than beauty
contests, auctions, and compare these with a socially optimal mechanism. Several economists
claim that auctions perform better than beauty contests as they are more transparent, are less
prone to favoritism, and give rise to less administrative burden for both the bidders and the
procurer. In an auction, providers submit one-dimensional bids on a project, and the winner is
chosen using a well-deﬁned allocation rule.
We study three simple auctions. Two of these auction types are based on the beauty contests
that we observe in practice. The ﬁrst auction is the lowest- reward auction. In this auction, the
provider that submits the lowest price per successful placement wins the project, and is rewarded
according to its bid. Second, we focus on the highest-output auction. This auction rewards the
project to the provider that promises the highest ‘effort’, i.e., the highest reduction in social
beneﬁts. The government pays the winner a reward for each unit of effort above its promise. The
third auction type we consider is the constant-reward auction, which the OECD proposes as an
alternative way to procure welfare-to-work projects. The government sells the project to the
highest bidder. The winner is then paid a ﬁxed reward for each unit of its effort.
We compare these auctions to the optimal mechanism, which has the following properties.
First, the government selects the most efﬁcient provider, provided that its efﬁciency level
exceeds a threshold level. Second, the winning provider exerts effort that is below the
full-information optimum. None of the three auctions turns out to be optimal.
However, when the number of bidding providers tends to inﬁnity, or when the tax distortion
approaches zero, the constant-rewards second-price auction and the highest-output auction
approach the optimal outcome. Moreover, using simulations we observe that the outcomes of the
constant-reward second-price auction and the highest effort auction rapidly approach the socially
optimal mechanism. In the case of three competing providers, when the collection of $1 in taxes
7costs $1, social welfare that is generated by these simple auctions is only 5% less than the
highest possible level of social welfare.
In contrast, the lowest-reward auction performs poorly relative to the other two simple
auctions. We ﬁnd that this auction solves the adverse selection problem in the sense that the
most efﬁcient provider is selected. However, a strong moral hazard problem remains as the
winning provider’s equilibrium effort tends to zero when the number of bidders increases. This
ﬁnding may place some doubt on the usefulness of having the price per successful placement as
one of the dimensions in a beauty contest.
81 Introduction
In several countries, governments use procurements for welfare-to-work programs.1 In these
procurements, the government sells welfare-to-work projects to employment service providers.
A welfare-to-work project typically consists of a number of unemployed people, and the
winning provider is rewarded on the basis of the number of these people that ﬁnd a job within a
speciﬁed period of time. These procurements give ﬂesh and blood to Demsetz’ (1968) idea of
competition ‘for’ the market.
What are the governments’ targets in the procurements? The success of a procurement
depends on (1) the number of people that ﬁnd a job, (2) the costs incurred by the employment
service provider, (3) the reduction in unemployment beneﬁts, and (4) the payments made from
the government to the employment service provider. The latter two are important as they imply
that the government raises less distortionary taxes.2
In reaching these targets, governments may be confronted with two types of economic
problems: adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection occurs when the procurement
does not select the ‘best’ employment provider, i.e., the provider that, relative to all other
providers, is able to help the unemployed people back to work in the most cost efﬁcient way.
Moral hazard may occur as the winner of the procurement has no incentive to put much effort in
the welfare-to-work project. An additional target may be a cheap procurement process.
Most governments that procure welfare-to-work programs use a beauty contest. Providers
submit an offer that contains a bid on several pre-speciﬁed dimensions. In the Netherlands, some
of these dimensions are well-deﬁned (such as the price for a successful placement), others are
rather vague (such as ‘experience’). The government then signs a contract with the provider
submitting the ‘best’ bid. This contract speciﬁes how the government rewards the ﬁrm for its
effort. Usually this is both input and output based: the government partly covers the cost of the
provider, and in addition gives it is monetary award for each successful placement. However, are
beauty contests indeed optimal? At least the administrative burden is usually high for these
mechanisms: it is time consuming and costly for ﬁrms to write an offer and for the government
to study and compare these offers.
In this paper, we study mechanisms that are simpler than beauty contests, auctions, and
compare these with a socially optimal mechanism. Several economists claim that auctions
perform better than beauty contests as they are more transparent, are less prone to favoritism,
and give rise to less administrative burden for both the bidders and the procurer.3 In an auction,
1 See OECD (2001) and Productivity Commission (2002) for Australia, and Struyven and Steurs (2003) for The
Netherlands. Zwinkels et al. (2004) provide a comparison of welfare-to-work procurements in Australia, Denmark, the
Netherlands, Sweden, the UK, and the US.
2 Ballard et al. (1985) estimate deadweight losses to lie between 17 and 56 cents for every extra $1 raised in taxes.
3 See, e.g., Binmore and Klemperer (2002).
9providers submit one-dimensional bids on a project, and the winner is chosen using a
well-deﬁned allocation rule. In Section 2, we describe the setting in which we study several
auction types. A ﬁxed number of employment service providers submit bids on a project. The
providers differ with respect to their efﬁciency level, which is private information to each
provider, and about which its competitors and the government are incompletely informed.
In Section 3, we study three simple auctions. Two of these auction types are based on the
beauty contests that we observe in practice. Usually, there are at least two objective dimensions
in these beauty contests on which bidders submits bids: (1) the price per successful placement,
and (2) the expected success rate, i.e., the fraction of people in the welfare-to-work project that
ﬁnds a job. The ﬁrst auction is the lowest-reward auction. In this auction, the provider that
submits the lowest price per successful placement, wins the project. Imagine that the winner
submitted a price equal to b. Then the government rewards the provider with b for every unit of
effort it puts in the project, i.e., for each unit of savings in the unemployment beneﬁts. We ﬁnd
that this auction solves the adverse selection problem in the sense that the most efﬁcient provider
is selected. However, a strong moral hazard problem remains as the winning provider’s
equilibrium effort tends to zero when the number of bidders increases. This ﬁnding may place
some doubt on the usefulness of having the price per successful placement as one of the
dimensions in the beauty contest.
Second, we focus on the highest-output auction. This auction rewards the project to the
provider that promises the highest ‘effort’, i.e., the highest reduction in social beneﬁts. The
government pays the winner a reward τ (e−b), where τ is a constant, e the actual effort by the
employment service provider, and b its promise in the auction. A negative reward is interpreted
as a ﬁne.
The third auction type we consider is the constant-reward auction, which OECD (2001)
proposes as an alternative way to procure welfare-to-work projects. The government sells the
project to the highest bidder, for instance in the second-price sealed-bid auction (the
constant-reward second-price auction4).The winner is paid a ﬁxed reward ρ for each unit of its
effort. OECD (2001) argues that this auction is optimal, provided that the government awards
the winner of this auction the marginal social value of each successful placement. However, the
OECD’s claim is based on McMillan (1992), who relies on the assumption of complete
information regarding the efﬁciency of the provider, and who ignores the positive impact of a
decrease in unemployment beneﬁts on government ﬁnances.
In Section 4, we construct an optimal mechanism. This mechanism is an incentive
compatible and individually rational direct revelation mechanism with the following properties.
First, the government selects the most efﬁcient provider, provided that its efﬁciency level
exceeds a threshold level. The winning provider then exerts effort that is below the
4 We will see later that the constant-reward ﬁrst-price auction is strategically equivalent to the highest-output auction.
10full-information optimum. The three auctions that we study in section 3 are not optimal.
However, when the number of bidding providers tends to inﬁnity, or when the tax distortion
approaches zero, the constant-rewards second-price auction and the highest-output auction
approach the optimal outcome.
Section 5 contains simulations on the three simple auctions, the socially optimal mechanism,
and the socially optimal mechanism under complete information. We observe that the
lowest-reward auction performs poorly relative to the two other simple auctions. Moreover, the
outcomes of the constant-reward second-price auction and the highest effort auction rapidly
approach the socially optimal mechanism. In the case of three competing providers, when the
collection of $1 in taxes costs $1, social welfare that is generated by these simple auctions is
only 5% less than the highest possible level of social welfare.
The following papers in the economic literature are related to ours. First of all, there is a
substantial literature on the optimal design of auctions. Myerson (1981) and Riley and
Samuelson (1981) show that the seller has an incentive to screen out the bidders with the lowest
types, for instance by setting a reserve price below which he accepts no bids. For overviews of
auction theory, see Klemperer (1999) and Krishna (2002). Secondly, the literature on incentive
contracts is related. See McMillan (1992) and Laffont and Tirole (1993) for overviews.
McAfee and McMillan (1986, 1987) and Laffont and Tirole (1987, 1993) build a bridge
between auction theory and incentive theory. Laffont and Tirole (1987, 1993) study a model in
which the government auctions an indivisible project to one of several risk neutral ﬁrms. The
government has to provide incentives for the selected ﬁrm to reduce the costs of the project.
McAfee and McMillan (1986) study a similar setting, assuming risk averse bidders. The optimal
contract in their model is usually an incentive contract, i.e., a contract that shares the risks
among the government and the winning bidder. McAfee and McMillan (1987) is the most
closely related to our paper. The most substantial difference between their paper and ours, is that
McAfee and McMillan maximizes the principal’s proﬁt, whereas we maximize social welfare,
taking into account the costs incurred by the winning agent. Qualitatively, the results of McAfee
and McMillan (1987) and ours are the same: the optimal mechanism screens out all providers
below a ﬁxed threshold, and the winning provider’s effort is lower than the full-information
optimum.
11122 The model
A risk neutral government wishes to procure a welfare-to-work project. We assume that n risk
neutral employment service providers participate in the procurement. Each provider i,






where αi ∈ [0,1] is provider i’s efﬁciency level. The effort level ei is observable, or the relevant
output is the sum of ei and a disturbance term with mean 0. The latter is irrelevant as by
assumption, both the government and the providers are risk neutral. In the speciﬁc context of
welfare-to-work programs, we interpret effort as the savings on social beneﬁts when people in
the project ﬁnd a job. Ci is convex, which is a natural assumption in this context. In addition, we
assume that the social welfare of each unit of savings on social beneﬁts (apart from the impact
on government ﬁnances) is equal to 1. The motivation for this assumption is that the marginal
unemployed person is indifferent between working and not working, so that his additional utility
for work equals 0. The society yields the output of his work, which is equal to the social beneﬁts
he received.5
The providers draw the αi’s independently from the same distribution with a cumulative





is strictly increasing in αi, which holds true for several standard distributions, including the
uniform and the exponential distributions. Provider i has the utility function
Ui =ti −Ci
where ti is the monetary transfer that it receives from the government.
Let S denote the net social welfare of the project. We follow Laffont and Tirole (1987) in that
the social cost of one unit of money is 1+λ, where λ > 0. Net social welfare is then given by
S = (σ +λ)ei −(1+λ)ti +ti −Ci(ei,αi) (2.1)







where i is the provider the government has selected for the welfare-to-work program. In other
words, each unit of the provider’s effort increases social welfare with 1+λ, while each unit of
5 Some claim that the impact on total social welfare is higher than the net savings on social beneﬁts. There may for
instance arise positive externalities from an unemployed person ﬁnding a job, which are rooted in a decrease in crime and
intergenerational welfare dependency (see OECD, 2001). However, there is little empirical evidence that these positive
externalities are substantial.
13its costs diminishes social welfare with one unit. An optimal mechanism maximizes S under the
restriction that the providers play a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and that it satisﬁes a
participation constraint (each participating provider should at least receive zero expected utility).
The ﬁrst-best optimum, i.e., the optimum under complete information, has the following
properties. First of all, the government selects the most efﬁcient provider, i.e., the provider with
the highest type αi, as this provider has the lowest Ci for a given effort level. Second, the
government induces this provider to exert effort αi. Finally, the government exactly covers the
costsCi. We will see that this ﬁrst-best optimum cannot be reached in our setting with
incomplete information: the government has to pay informational rents to the provider. In the
optimal mechanism under incomplete information, the government ‘pays’ these informational
rents by (1) only selecting the most efﬁcient provider if its type exceeds a threshold level, (2)
inducing effort level lower than αi, and (3) covering more than the costs the provider actually
incurs.
143 Simple mechanisms
We consider three simple mechanisms the government may use to allocate the welfare-to-work
project to one of the employment service providers. These mechanisms are all two-stage games.
In the ﬁrst stage of each game, the government auctions the project. In the second stage, the
winning provider chooses its effort level and the government rewards the provider depending on
its effort choice.
3.1 The lowest-reward auction
The ﬁrst mechanism is the lowest-reward auction. In this auction, the provider that submits the
lowest reward, wins the project. Imagine that the winner submitted a reward level equal to b.
Then the government rewards the provider with b for every unit of effort it puts in the project.
The following proposition characterizes equilibrium bidding for this auction.6








L(b,α) = b+α −1,
where b is the bid of the winner. B and L constitute a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium of
the lowest-reward auction. B is strictly decreasing in α and n.
From Proposition 1, we can draw the following conclusions. First of all, as B is strictly
decreasing in α, the auction always rewards the project to the most efﬁcient provider. In other
words, this auction completely solves the adverse selection problem. Second, the provider
chooses its effort at the level L at which the marginal beneﬁts of effort (b) are equal to the
marginal costs (C0
i(L) = L+1−αi). Third, both the expected effort level and social welfare
converge to zero when the number of providers tends to inﬁnity: more competition strengthens
the moral hazard problem. This follows from the following trade-off. The more providers, the
more efﬁcient is the most efﬁcient provider. However, the larger the number of providers in the
auction, the more aggressively they have to bid. The winner, having submitted the lowest
reward, then has little incentives to put much effort in the project as the marginal beneﬁts from
its effort are very low.
3.2 The highest-output auction
In order to avoid the moral hazard problem that is imminent in the lowest-reward auction, the
government may pay the winning provider a constant reward τ for each unit of its effort. The
6 All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
15highest-output auction implements a mechanism with this property. This auction rewards the
project to the provider that promises the highest output level. The government pays the winner
the following amount of money, depending on its actual output level e and the output level b it
promised in the auction:
t(e,b) = τ (e−b)










0 xdF(x)n−1 if τ < 1











if α ≥ α






τ −1+α if α ≥ α
0 if α < α
with B and L a bidding function and an effort function respectively. B and L constitute a
symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the highest-output auction. B is strictly increasing in α
for α ≥ α and B is strictly increasing in n for τ ≥ 1.
The above proposition suggests that the highest-output auction is better than the lowest-reward
auction for τ = 1. Both auctions are efﬁcient in the sense that the project is always rewarded to
the provider with the highest efﬁciency parameter. However, the effort by the winning provider
is higher in the highest-output auction. Moreover, as we will show later, if λ = 0 or if n tends to
inﬁnity, the highest-output auction is optimal for τ = 1.
3.3 The constant-reward second-price auction
Alternatively, the government may use the constant-reward auction. OECD (2001) proposes this
auction as an alternative to the beauty contest that are usually used in welfare-to-work programs.
We focus on the constant-reward second-price auction. In this auction, the project is allocated in
the second-price sealed-bid auction: the winner is the highest bidding provider, which has to pay
the bid of the second highest bidder to the government. The winner is then rewarded ρ monetary
units per unit of effort. Note that the constant reward ﬁrst-price auctions is strategically
equivalent to the highest-output auction. A bid b in this auction is equivalent to a bid b/ρ in the
highest-output auction with τ = ρ.
16Proposition 3 provides the equilibrium properties of the constant-reward second-price auction.







2 if α ≥ 1−ρ






ρ −1+α if α ≥ 1−ρ
0 if α < 1−ρ
,
B and L constitute a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the constant-reward auction. B is
constant in n and strictly increasing in α for all α ≥ ρ −1.
For ρ = 1, the constant-reward second-price auction turns out to have the same properties as the
highest-output auction with τ = 1. Both auctions are equally efﬁcient and share the same
expected effort levels, expected payments, and expected social welfare. This result follows from
a ‘revenue equivalence theorem’ which states that providers obtain the same expected payment
from all mechanisms which allocate the project to the same provider and in which the winner
provides the same effort level, provided that the utility of the lowest type equals zero. We prove
this result in the Appendix in the proof of Proposition 4. Moreover, as we will show in the next
section, when λ = 0 or n tends to inﬁnity, the constant-reward second-price auction is optimal
for ρ = 1.
17184 The socially optimal mechanism
What is the socially optimal mechanism, i.e., the mechanism that maximizes (2.1)? According to
Myerson (1981), we may, without loss of generality, restrict our attention to incentive
compatible and individually rational direct revelation mechanisms. Let
˜ α = (˜ α1,..., ˜ αn)
be the vector of announcements by provider 1,...,n respectively. We consider mechanisms
µ =(xi(˜ α),ei(˜ α),ti(˜ α)) that induce a truth telling Bayesian Nash equilibrium, where, given the
announcement ˜ α, xi(˜ α) is the probability that provider i wins the contract, and, given that
provider i wins the contract, ei(˜ α) is its effort and ti(˜ α) is the monetary transfer it receives from
the government.





























The optimal mechanism µ∗ shows that the government optimally selects the most efﬁcient
provider, provided that its efﬁciency level exceeds α > 0. This provider exerts effort according
to e∗
i and t∗
i determines the payments it receives from the government. Observe that the desired
effort level e∗
i (α) and α do not depend on the number of bidding providers.
Three types of inefﬁciency arise from this mechanism. First, since e∗
i (α) < αi for all αi < 1,
the provider’s effort is lower than in the full-information optimum. Second, the government will
not contract with any provider whose efﬁciency level is below α, whereas in the full-information
world, the government would contract with any provider. The latter is analogous to a reserve
price in an optimal auction (see, e.g., Myerson, 1981). Third, as t∗
i (α) ≥Ci(e∗
i (α)), the
government covers more than the costs that are actually born by the winning provider, which is
inefﬁcient as government ﬁnances are socially costly. These types of inefﬁciency give the
government the opportunity to capture some of the informational rents that arise because of
incomplete information.
Corollary 5. Both the highest-output auction with τ = 1 and the constant-reward second-price
auction with ρ = 1 are optimal if (1) λ = 0 or (2) n tends to inﬁnity.
19Recall that the constant-reward second-price auction with ρ = 1 and the highest-output auction
with τ = 1 always select the provider i with the highest efﬁciency level, and induce it to choose
effort αi. Corollary 5 follows immediate from the expressions for e∗
i and α. If λ = 0 then
e∗
i (α) = αi and α = 0, so that both auctions are optimal. Moreover, as both do not depend on n,
the only effect of increasing n is to change the distribution of the efﬁciency level of the selected
provider. When n increases, the probability that the highest type exceeds α equals one. In
addition, e∗
i (α) tends to αi for αi approaching 1. As the highest type approaches 1 for n tending
to inﬁnity, the two auctions are optimal for large n. In the next section, we investigate in a simple
setting with the uniform distribution how close both auctions come to the socially optimal
mechanism.
205 Simulation
In this section, we simulate the outcomes of the model under the simplifying assumption that the
providers draw their efﬁciency parameter from the uniform distribution on the interval [0,1], i.e.,
F =U[0,1]. Let LRA denote the lowest-reward auction, CRA the constant-reward second-price
auction with ρ = 1, and HOA the highest output auction with τ = 1. Equilibrium bidding for the
















We let OPT denote the optimal mechanism, which always selects the most efﬁcient provider
given that its efﬁciency parameter exceeds λ








1+λ αi − λ
1+λ if αi ≥ λ
1+2λ
0 if αi < λ
1+2λ
.
Table 5.1 contains expected effort and expected social welfare arising from these three simple
mechanisms under λ = 1. Comparing the outcomes of these mechanisms with the socially
optimal mechanism and the ﬁrst-best mechanisms, we observe the following. First of all, CRA
and HOA are equivalent in the sense that both induce the same effort from the winner of the
auction and that the two mechanisms generate the same level of social welfare. Second, the
outcomes of LRA deviate quite dramatically from the outcomes of the socially optimal
mechanism: an increase in the number of providers may result in a decrease in the expected
effort from the winning ﬁrm. The positive effect on effort arising from more bidders increasing
the expected efﬁciency turns out to be diminished by the negative effect that more bidders
decrease the per unit payment.
Third, the efforts under CRA and HOA are the same as in the social optimum. Fourth, the
effort in the optimal mechanism is lower than the effort in a ﬁrst-best world. The reason is that
the government has to pay an informational rent, so that it induces less effort than in the
complete information optimum. Fifth, the expected effort level and social welfare arising from
both CRA and HOA converge to the social optimum. Sixth, the deviation from these two
mechanisms from the social optimal is small even for a small number of bidders. Just a bit of
competition (three bidders) is sufﬁcient for CRA and HOA to perform well (reaching at least
95% of the maximum level of social welfare). And ﬁnally, the optimal mechanism converges to
the ﬁrst best. The intuition behind this observation is that for large n, the government can exploit
competition between the providers, which reduces the level of informational rents it has to pay.
21Table 5.1 Simulation results for λ = 1.
n LRA CRA HOA OPT First-Best
Expected effort
1 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.333 0.500
2 0.444 0.667 0.667 0.519 0.667
3 0.375 0.750 0.750 0.630 0.750
4 0.320 0.800 0.800 0.701 0.800
5 0.278 0.833 0.833 0.750 0.833
6 0.245 0.857 0.857 0.786 0.857
7 0.219 0.875 0.875 0.813 0.875
8 0.198 0.889 0.889 0.833 0.889
9 0.180 0.900 0.900 0.850 0.900
Expected social welfare
1 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.222 0.333
2 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.370 0.500
3 0.375 0.450 0.450 0.474 0.600
4 0.373 0.533 0.533 0.550 0.667
5 0.357 0.595 0.595 0.607 0.714
6 0.337 0.643 0.643 0.652 0.750
7 0.316 0.681 0.681 0.687 0.778
8 0.296 0.711 0.711 0.717 0.800
9 0.278 0.736 0.736 0.741 0.818
For larger λ, the gap between CRA and HOA on one side, and the optimal mechanism on the
other side becomes larger. This can be observed from table 5.2, which contains simulation
results for λ = 2. Qualitatively, the observations in table 5.2 are the same as in table 5.1.
However, note that social welfare is larger for λ = 2 than for λ = 1. This is straightforward as
the higher λ, the more valuable the efforts by the employment service providers for society, as
the impact on government ﬁnances is larger.
22Table 5.2 Simulation results for λ = 2.
n LRA CRA HOA OPT First-Best
Expected effort
1 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.300 0.500
2 0.444 0.667 0.667 0.480 0.667
3 0.375 0.750 0.750 0.594 0.750
4 0.320 0.800 0.800 0.670 0.800
5 0.278 0.833 0.833 0.723 0.833
6 0.245 0.857 0.857 0.762 0.857
7 0.219 0.875 0.875 0.792 0.875
8 0.198 0.889 0.889 0.815 0.889
9 0.180 0.900 0.900 0.833 0.900
Expected social welfare
1 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.300 0.500
2 0.444 0.417 0.417 0.510 0.750
3 0.525 0.600 0.600 0.662 0.900
4 0.533 0.733 0.733 0.777 1.000
5 0.516 0.833 0.833 0.865 1.071
6 0.490 0.911 0.911 0.934 1.125
7 0.462 0.972 0.972 0.991 1.167
8 0.435 1.022 1.022 1.037 1.200
9 0.409 1.064 1.064 1.076 1.227
23246 Conclusion
In this paper, we have applied the theory of auctioning incentive contracts to welfare-to-work
programs. In procurements for welfare-to-work projects to employment service providers,
governments trade off adverse selection (the winning provider is not the most efﬁcient one) and
moral hazard (the winning provider shirks in its effort to reintegrate unemployed people). We
have compared the optimal mechanism with three simple auctions (the lowest-reward auction,
the highest-output auction, and the constant-reward second-price auction). We have shown that
the latter two auctions approximate the socially optimal mechanism if the number of providers is
large. In contrast to the optimal mechanism, the three auctions are ‘simple’ as they are not
context dependent, i.e., ‘the rules of the game’ do not depend on λ, F and n. Using simulations,
we have observed that competition between three bidders is already sufﬁcient for the outcome of
these auctions to reach 95% of the optimal level of social welfare. The lowest-reward auction, on
the other hand, performs poorly. We show that if the number of providers is large, a
‘race-to-the-bottom’ will emerge, i.e., the winning bid converges to zero. As a consequence, the
winner has little incentives to put much effort in the project as the marginal beneﬁts from its
effort are very low.
There are several interesting subjects for future research. First of all, as far as we know,
auctions are rarely used in the practice of welfare-to-work programs. In some countries, beauty
contests are used (e.g., in the Netherlands), and in others, the government awards contracts on
the basis of the reputation the employment service providers gained in the past (e.g., Job
Network in Australia). The question that arises is whether there are circumstances in which
beauty contests or reputation mechanisms outperform auctions. Secondly, we have assumed that
each unit of unemployment beneﬁts saved increases social welfare with one unit plus the
positive impact on government ﬁnances. In practice, social welfare may increase with more than
one unit, for instance because positive externalities arise from people ﬁnding a job. What is the
optimal mechanism in such a situation? How well do the constant-reward second-price auction
and the highest-output auction perform? Finally, the effect of the winner’s curse and risk
aversion among the employment service providers may be interesting topics for further research.
2526Appendix A Proofs of propositions
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We construct the equilibrium using backward induction, ﬁrst deriving the effort level by the







where b is its bid in the auction and α its efﬁciency level. Straightforward calculations yield the
equilibrium effort level
L(b,α) = b+α −1.
To derive equilibrium bidding in the auction, we suppose that in equilibrium, all providers use
the same bid function. By a standard argument, this bid function must be strictly increasing and
continuous. LetU(α,β) be the utility for a provider with efﬁciency level α who behaves as if









The ﬁrst term in (A.1) refers to the probability that a provider announcing β wins the auction,
























is a solution. Let Xn be a stochastic variable with distribution function F(·)
n−1
2 . Note that B can
be rewritten as
B(α) = 1−E(Xn|Xn ≤ α)
so that it is readily observed that B is strictly decreasing in α. Moreover, as Xn+1 strictly
ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates Xn, B is strictly decreasing in n.
27A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We construct the equilibrium using backward induction, ﬁrst deriving the effort level by the







Straightforward calculations yield the equilibrium effort level
L(b,α) = max{0,τ +α −1}.
To derive equilibrium bidding in the auction, we suppose that in equilibrium, all providers use
the same bid function. By a standard argument, this function must be strictly increasing and
continuous. LetU(α,β) be the utility for a provider with efﬁciency level α who behaves as if









The ﬁrst term in (A.1) refers to the probability that a provider announcing β wins the auction,

























2τ −1(τ +α −1)2−τ −1F(α)−n+1R α
0 (τ +x −1)dF(x)n−1−C

if α ≥ α
0 if α < α






0 (τ +x −1)F(x)n−1dx if τ < 1
0 if τ ≥ 1
.











so that it is readily observed that B is strictly increasing in α for α ≥ α. Moreover, asYn+1
strictly ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates Yn, B is strictly increasing in n if τ ≥ 1.
28A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
We construct the equilibrium using backward induction, ﬁrst deriving the effort level by the







Straightforward calculations yield the equilibrium effort level
L(b,α) = max{0,ρ +α −1}.
In the auction, each provider has a dominant strategy, which is to submit a bid equal to its proﬁts






These dominant strategies constitute a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. It is readily observed that B
is constant in n and strictly increasing in α for all α ≥ ρ −1.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The proof follows the same logic as Laffont and Tirole (1987) and McAfee and McMillan
(1987). Without loss of generality, we may restrict our attention to direct revelation mechanisms
in which each provider i announces an efﬁciency parameter ˜ αi. Let
˜ α = (˜ α1,..., ˜ αn).
We consider mechanisms (xi(.),ei(.),ti(.)) that induce a truth telling Bayesian Nash equilibrium,
where, given the announcement ˜ α, xi(˜ α) is the probability that provider i wins the contract,
ei(˜ α) is the effort exerted by provider i given that it wins the contract, and ti(˜ α) is the monetary
transfer to provider i if it wins the contract.
A.4.1 Providers’ bidding behaviour
If all providers bid truthfully, provider i’s interim utility (i.e., its expected utility given its
efﬁciency parameter αi) is equal to






LetUi(αi, ˜ αi) be provider i’s utility when it has efﬁciency parameter αi, it announces ˜ αi, and all
other providers truthfully reveal their type. Then
Ui(αi, ˜ αi) = Eα−i[ti(α−i, ˜ αi)−xi(α−i, ˜ αi)ϕ(ei(α−i, ˜ αi))]
+αiEα−i[ei(α−i, ˜ αi)xi(α−i, ˜ αi)]. (A.4)
















The participation constraint then reduces to
Ui(0) ≥ 0.
A.4.2 The government’s problem










˙ Ui(αi) = Eα−i[ei(α)xi(α)] for all αi, i
Ui(0) ≥ 0 for all i
.
According to a standard argument, ei(α) only depends on αi (see Laffont and Tirole (1987) and
McAfee and McMillan (1987).). Let
Xi(ai) ≡ Eα−i[xi(α)].





s.t. ˙ Ui(αi) = ei(αi)Xi(ai),
Ui(0) ≥ 0.
The Hamiltonian Hi of this program is given by
Hi(αi,ei,Ui,µi) = {−λUi +(1+λ)Xi(ai)[ei −ϕ(ei)+αiei]} f (αi)+µieiXi(ai).
Using the Pontryagin principle, we obtain




Let α is the unique solution to y = λ
1+λ
1−F(y)
f(y) w.r.t. y. Substituting ϕ(ei) = 1
2e2
i +ei together









f(αi) if αi ≥ α
0 if αi < α
. (A.6)













































2 is strictly increasing in ai for ai ≥ α, the optimal mechanism
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